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FARBER V. CITY OF PATERSON: THE THIRD
CIRCUIT WEIGHS IN ON THE FUTURE OF
PROTECTING POLITICAL CLASSES
UNDER SECTION 1985(3)

INTRODUCTION

In response to the violence and discrimination directed toward African Americans and their supporters in the post-Civil War South, Congress enacted several civil rights statutes to protect those being
harmed and to punish those inflicting the harm.' Today, one such statute is codified at 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3).2 Section 1985(3) "provides a civil cause of action against individuals who conspire to
deprive 'any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.'- 3 In Griffin v. Breckenridge,4 the U.S. Supreme Court changed the course of

section 1985(3) jurisprudence by holding that it reaches private, as
well as public, conspiracies. 5 The Griffin Court also found that, for an
action to violate section 1985(3), it must be motivated by "some racial,
' '6
or perhaps otherwise class-based,invidiously discriminatory animus.
1. See Ken Gormley, Private Conspiraciesand the Constitution: A Modern Vision of 42 U.S.C.
Section 1985(3), 64 TEx. L. REV. 527, 534-40 (1985).
2. Section 1985(3) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering
the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws . . . in any case of
conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause
to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is
injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an
action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against
any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2000).
3. Devin S. Schindler, Note, The Class-BasedAnimus Requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3): A
Limiting Strategy Gone Awry?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 88, 88 (1985) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
4. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
5. Id. at 101; see also infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
6. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 (emphasis added); see also infra note 41 and accompanying text.
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Over a decade later, in United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local
610 v. Scott,7 the Court marginally refined the meaning of "otherwise
class-based" by listing classes not included. 8 Although the Scott Court
discussed whether a conspiracy motivated by one's political affiliation
would be satisfactory under the Griffin standard, the Court unfortunately left the question unanswered. 9 Another ten years passed
before the Court decided Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,'0
holding that opposition to abortion did not qualify as "class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus."' 1 Bray addressed the characteristics of an identifiable class and the invidious discrimination necessary
to show a cognizable section 1985(3) claim-characteristics that courts
could use to determine the section 1985(3) eligibility of victims of political discrimination.1 2 Nonetheless, the Court has never squarely determined whether political affiliation is a class protected by section
1985(3).
The Court's refusal to decide whether political affiliation is a cognizable class under section 1985(3) has led to a three-way split among
the courts of appeals. 13 As of this writing, the most recent circuit to
weigh in on the issue is the Third Circuit, deciding in Farberv. City of
Paterson that a plaintiff could not maintain a section 1985(3) claim by
alleging that she was discriminated against because of her affiliation
with the Republican Party. 14 In determining that political affiliation is
not a cognizable class under section 1985(3), Farberdeepened the split
among the circuits and highlighted the need for the Court to resolve
this issue.
Part II of this Note explores section 1985(3)'s background, including a brief description of its legislative history, initial Court decisions
suggesting little use for the statute, and the Court's construction of
section 1985(3) since it first revived the statute in the early 1970s. 15
Part III examines the Third Circuit's analysis in Farber.16 Part IV critiques Farber,explaining the jurisprudential problems and possible solutions to those problems that the Third Circuit might have
7. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
8. Id. at 837-39 (holding that economic and commercial classes are not protected under section 1985(3)).
9. See id. at 835-37.
10. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
11. Id. at 263, 266-74.
12. See infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 114.
14. 440 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2006).
15. See infra notes 20-74 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 75-136 and accompanying text.
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considered. 17 Part V briefly comments on Farber's potential impact
upon future court decisions and hypothesizes that courts following
Farber's analysis would reject potential section 1985(3) claims arising
out of a recent political controversy, the dismissal of several U.S. attorneys for alleged political reasons.' 8 Part VI concludes that Farber
correctly determined section 1985(3)'s scope in finding that political
affiliation should not be a cognizable class.' 9
II.

BACKGROUND

Before embarking on any discussion of section 1985(3), one must
first understand the statute's evolution since its genesis over a century
ago. This Part initially discusses the legislative history leading up to
section 1985(3)'s enactment and the subsequent period of time in
which it was rendered largely ineffective by U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 20 Next, this Part focuses on Griffin v. Breckenridge, in which
the Court held that section 1985(3) reaches both private and public
conspiracies and requires a conspiracy motivated by "some racial, or
' 2t It
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus."
then examines the Court's holding in United Brotherhood of
Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott that claims alleging conspiracies motivated by commercial or economic bias are not actionable under section 1985(3).22 Part II concludes by discussing Bray v. Alexandria
17. See infra notes 137-247 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 248-263 and accompanying text.
19. Other aspects of section 1985(3) are discussed in this Note as well, but only to the extent
that they relate to the primary discussion on political affiliation as a cognizable class. One related question is the proper constitutional source of congressional power to enact section
1985(3). See Kenneth A.K. Martin, Note, The Sixth Circuit Takes a Stand: Conklin v. Lovely
and the Extension of Protection Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) to Victims of Non-Racial, Politically
DiscriminatoryConspiracies,20 U. TOL. L. REV. 733. 735 (1989) (stating that Congress enacted
the Ku Klux Klan Act pursuant to its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
But cf Griffin, 403 U.S. at 107 (declining to consider the "scope of the power of Congress under
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"). Another related question is what rights plaintiffs may
vindicate under section 1985(3). Compare Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S.
263, 278 (1993) (stating that only the rights to be free from involuntary servitude and to travel
interstate are protected from private conspiracies), and United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v.
Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 830 (1983) (holding that a private conspiracy to violate First Amendment
rights is not a violation of section 1985(3)), with Scott, 463 U.S. at 849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(arguing that section 1985(3) prohibits interference with First Amendment rights by private conspiracy even without state involvement). It should also be noted that "political affiliation" is
used in this Note only to characterize a class of persons under a section 1985(3) claim, not in the
context of the First Amendment freedom to associate, or any other claims that might arise from
the infringement of that freedom, unless otherwise specified.
20. See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
21. 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (emphasis added); see infra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
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Women's Health Clinic, in which the Court held that opposition to
abortions did not qualify as the invidiously discriminatory animus
needed to state a section 1985(3) claim and explained what constitutes
23
an "identifiable" class for section 1985(3) purposes.
A.

Section 1985(3) Pre-Griffin

Although the Emancipation Proclamation, the end of the Civil War,
and the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment all served to abolish slavery, the Reconstruction-era Congress still faced the issue of
continuing violence aimed at the newly freed African Americans, particularly in the South. 24 Members of the recently formed Ku Klux
Klan intimidated and murdered African Americans and white sympathizers throughout the South "in an attempt to overthrow the Reconstruction policy of the Republican Congress. '25 Recognizing that the
state and local courts were "unable, or unwilling," to quell the rampant violence, 26 Congress sought to use federal law to reach the Klan's
activities and responded with the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the "Ku
27
Klux Klan Act").
Section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, the predecessor to 42 U.S.C.
section 1985(3), caused intense debate in Congress, because the language of the original version was considered too broad. 28 The "equal
protection" and "equal privileges and immunities" language found in
section 1985(3) today was adopted as a compromise-"[t]his language
limited the reach of the statute to a small subset of private conspiracies-namely those ...that threatened the equal protection of certain
classes of individuals, especially the newly freed [African Americans]." ' 29 However, in the years following the enactment of the Ku
23. See infra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
24. Gormley, supra note 1, at 534. The Thirteenth Amendment pronounces that "[n]either
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
25. Gormley, supra note 1, at 534.
26. Id. at 535.
27. See Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871); Gormley, supra note 1, at 536. In
addition to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Reconstruction Congress passed four other important pieces of civil rights legislation to combat the ongoing violence and racial discrimination in
the South. Gormley, supra note 1, at 534 & n.6, 536 & n.14 (listing statutes passed to protect
voting rights, prohibit racial discrimination in public accommodations, and outlaw Black Codes).
28. Gormley, supra note 1, at 537.
29. Id. at 539. As Justice Stewart explained in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), the
original version "was solely a criminal provision outlawing certain conspiratorial acts done with
intent 'to do any act in violation of the rights, privileges, or immunities of another person,"' and
"the present civil remedy was added" with the amendment. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 99-100 (quoting
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (1871)). The criminal and civil portions of section 2
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Klux Klan Act, section 2 of the Act remained of little use to putative
plaintiffs due to "hostile Supreme Court decisions. ' 30 The state of
section 1985(3) jurisprudence remained dependent upon these decisions until the Court changed course in 1971.
B.

Griffin v. Breckenridge

In Griffin v. Breckenridge,31 a group of African Americans brought
a section 1985(3) claim after they were threatened and severely
beaten by two white defendants in Mississippi. 32 The plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants were motivated by a conspiracy to intimidate and
prevent the plaintiffs and other African Americans from "seeking the
equal protection of the laws" and from "enjoying and exercising their
rights, privileges and immunities as citizens. ' 33 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim, 34 concluding that it was bound by the precedent set forth in Collins v.
Hardyman,35 which, in the Fifth Circuit's opinion, held that section
36
1985(3) did not cover private conspiracies.
of the Ku Klux Klan Act were later divided up and codified in three different statutes. The civil
portion became 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3). The criminal portion was further divided and placed
in two different sections of the Revised Statutes. One portion survived to become 18 U.S.C.
section 241, while the other portion, Rev. Stat. section 5519, was struck down in United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882). Gormley, supra note 1, at 540 n.30; see also infra note 30.
30. Schindler, supra note 3, at 89. In Harris, the Court found the criminal counterpart of
section 1985(3) to be unconstitutional, reasoning that, because the act was not limited to state
action, it was beyond the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 89 n.5 (citing Harris, 106
U.S. at 638-39); see also Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887) (reaffirming Harris). In 1951,
the Court limited the scope of section 1985(3) in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), by
"impos[ing] a state action requirement on § 1985(3) causes of action," a requirement similar to
that which the Court had found necessary to render the statute in Harris constitutional. Schindler, supra note 3, at 89 n.5.
31. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
32. Id. at 89-90. The plaintiffs were passengers in an automobile driven by a person whom
the defendants mistakenly believed to be a civil rights worker. Id. at 90. Under this mistaken
belief, the defendants drove their truck in front of the automobile, forced the occupants to abandon the automobile, threatened the plaintiffs while the driver was clubbed, and finally clubbed
and severely injured the plaintiffs. Id. at 90-91.
33. Id. at 90-91. The plaintiffs alleged that they were deprived of several rights, including the
following:
[R]ights to freedom of speech, movement, association and assembly; the right to petition their government for redress of grievances; their right to be secure in their person;
their right not to be enslaved nor deprived of life, liberty or property other than by due
process of law, and their rights to travel the public highways without restraint in the
same terms as white citizens in Kemper County, Mississippi ....
Id. at 91-92.
34. Id. at 92.
35. 341 U.S. 651.
36. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 92-93. The Court in Collins had, "in effect[,] construed the ... language of § 1985(3) as reaching only conspiracies under color of state law." Id. at 92; cf. Collins,
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari. In the Court's decision, Justice Stewart set out to determine the "scope and constitutionality" of
37
section 1985(3) by examining (1) the language of the statute itself,
(2) the companion provisions of section 1985(3),38 and (3) the legislative history of section 1985(3). 39 After this examination, the Court
found it "evident that all indicators-text, companion provisions, and
legislative history-point unwaveringly to § 1985(3)'s coverage of private conspiracies. ' 40 The Court was concerned, however, that this expansion would lead lower courts to interpret section 1985(3) as a
341 U.S. at 663 (Burton, J., dissenting) ("The language of the statute refutes the suggestion that
action under color of state law is a necessary ingredient of the cause of action which it recognizes."). The Fifth Circuit, in its opinion, "expressed 'serious doubts' as to the 'continued vitality' of Collins v. Hardyman, and stated that 'it would not [be surprised] if Collins v. Hardyman
were disapproved and if § 1985(3) were held to embrace private conspiracies to interfere with
rights of national citizenship."' Griffin, 403 U.S. at 92 (citations omitted) (quoting Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 410 F.2d 817, 823, 825-26 (5th Cir. 1969)).
37. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 96-98. The Court found that, "[o]n their face, the words of the statute
fully encompass the conduct of private persons" and noted that section 1985(3) spoke "simply of
'two or more persons . . .' who 'conspire or go in disguise . . ."'

and reasoned that going in

disguise, in this context, was not an activity associated with official action. Id. at 96. The Court
went on to state that, while section 1985(3) has language similar to that found in the Fourteenth
Amendment, there was nothing "inherent in the [language] that require[d] the action working
the deprivation to come from the State," and that the "failure to mention any [public action]
requisite [could] be viewed as an important indication of congressional intent to speak in
§ 1985(3) of all deprivations of 'equal protection of the laws' and 'equal privileges and immunities under the laws,' whatever their source." Id. at 96-97 (emphasis in original). Compare 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) ("for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class
of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws"), with U.S. CONST.amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person...
the equal protection of the laws."). The Court noted that in previous constructions of criminal
statutes similar to section 1985(3), the Court had held that the statutes reach private action.
Griffin, 403 U.S. at 97-98 (citing United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951); United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883)).
38. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 98-99. The Court found that the "under color of state law" element of
42 U.S.C. section 1983, along with another clause in section 1985(3) that dealt specifically with
interference with state officials, made it "impossible to believe" that the language in section
1985(3) was intended to "duplicate the coverage" of these separate provisions. Id. at 99.
39. Id. at 99-101. The Court explained that the section was originally introduced in the 42nd
Congress solely as a "criminal provision outlawing certain conspiratorial acts done with intent to
do any act in violation of the rights, privileges, or immunities of another person." Id. at 99-100
(internal quotation marks omitted). However, the expansive scope of this language led to calls
for amendment that were answered by adding the present civil remedy. The Court explained
that "[t]he explanations of the added language centered entirely on the animus or motivation
that would be required, and there was no suggestion whatever that liability would not be imposed for purely private conspiracies." Id. at 100. The Court noted in conclusion that "[o]ther
supporters of the bill were even more explicit in their insistence upon coverage of private action." Id. at 101 (quoting statements by House representatives before the amendment was introduced and a statement by a senator supporting the Senate bill).
40. Id. at 101.
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"general federal tort law," a use that Congress never intended, and
found that the statute's requirement of "intent to deprive of equal
protection, or equal privileges and immunities" meant that conspirators' actions must be motivated by "some racial, or perhaps otherwise
' 4t
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.
Next, the Court defined the four elements constituting a valid section 1985(3) claim: the defendant (1) conspired or went "in disguise
on the highway or on the premises of another" (2) "for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons
of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws" by (3) "any act in furtherance of. . . the conspiracy," (4) where a person was "injured in his person or property" or
"deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of
the United States."'42 Applying these elements, the Court found that
the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action under section 1985(3).43 The
Court concluded that there was a "source of congressional power to
reach the private conspiracy alleged" and that it was not unconstitu44
tional for section 1985(3) to encompass private conspiracies.
C.

United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott

Twelve years after Griffin, the Court was faced with another section
1985(3) quandary in United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 610 v.
Scott.45 In Scott, non-union construction workers, who were hired by
a construction company that employed'workers irrespective of union
41. Id. at 101-02 (third emphasis added). The Court, in a footnote accompanying this requirement, specifically reserved the question of which classes "otherwise class-based" encompassed.
Id. at 102 n.9.
42. Id. at 102-03 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
43. Id. at 103. The Court found that the complaint fully and particularly alleged a conspiracy
to assault the plaintiffs. Id. The Court next found that the allegations that the defendants acted
under the mistaken belief that the driver was a civil rights worker and that they engaged in a
conspiracy to prevent and intimidate African Americans from seeking equal protection and enjoying equal privileges and immunities "clearly support[ed] the requisite animus to deprive the
[plaintiffs] of the equal enjoyment of legal rights because of their race." Id. The acts in furtherance of the conspiracy requirement were found to be "amply satisf[ied]" by the "claims of detention, threats, and battery." Id. Finally, the Court found that the plaintiffs had alleged personal
injury, satisfying the last requirement, and that it was irrelevant whether or not the driver was
the conspiracy's only target. Id.
44. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 103-06. The Court found no constitutional difficulties with the statute,
considering that it had been settled that a similar criminal statute with far broader phrasing, 18
U.S.C. section 241, reached private conspiracies and was held to be constitutional. Id. at 104.
Further, the Court found two sources of congressional power to reach the conspiracy at issue:
section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and the constitutionally protected right of interstate
travel. Id. at 105-06.
45. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
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membership, were beaten by union members. 46 The plaintiffs, two
non-union workers who had been beaten, brought section 1985(3)
claims against the local unions and various individuals. 47 An en banc
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for the plaintiff,
holding that "§ 1985(3) reached conspiracies motivated either by po48
litical or economic bias."
Justice White, writing for a five-to-four majority, reversed the Fifth
Circuit's decision and held that section 1985(3) did not reach "conspiracies motivated by economic or commercial animus. ' '4 9 However, in
coming to this decision, the Court left open the question of what
other, nonracial biases could motivate an actionable conspiracy under
section 1985(3). 5o Unpersuaded by the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that
section 1985(3) reached conspiracies motivated by economic and political biases, 5 1 the Court believed that such a proposition would lead
46. Id. at 827-28.
47. Id. at 828.
48. Id. at 829-30. The district court had found the protected class to be that of "non-union
laborers and employers." Id. at 829. The Fifth Circuit understood the plaintiffs to be claiming
that the defendants' conspiracy was aimed at denying "their First Amendment right to associate
with their fellow nonunion employees" and found that it was not "necessary to show some state
involvement to demonstrate an infringement of First Amendment rights." Id. at 830. The Court
disagreed, holding that state involvement is needed to make out a claim based on "a conspiracy
to violate First Amendment rights." Id. at 832.
49. Id. at 838. The Court thought that "such a construction would extend § 1985(3) into the
economic life of the country in a way that [the Court doubted] that the 1871 Congress would
have intended when it passed the provision in 1871" and that economic or commercial conflicts
were better dealt with by addressing statutes specifically to the problems and applying general
tort law. Id. at 837-39.
50. Id. at 835-37. It is debatable whether this discussion suggests that the Court would find
that a political class is or is not a protected class under section 1985(3) if it was squarely faced
with that question. One commentator found that the Scott court "implied ... that conspiracies
devoid of racial considerations may not raise cognizable claims." Martin, supra note 19, at 743
n.49. The Third Circuit in Farber v. City of Paterson also agreed that Scott suggested that the
Court would decide against protecting classes based on political affiliation. 440 F.3d 131, 139-40
(3d Cir. 2006). However, another commentator has viewed Scott's discussion as "lend[ing] support to both sides of the issue of political party members as a protected class." Daniel E. Durden, Note, Republicans as a Protected Class?: Harrison v. KVAT Food Management, Inc. and
the Scope of Section 1985(3), 36 AM. U. L. REV. 193, 208 (1986). One thing is certain: "[w]hile
in some ways [Scott] provided useful information, it failed to prevent the subsequent, inconsistent application of [section 1985(3)] between circuits. In fact, as the post-Scott circuit decisions
have demonstrated, the Supreme Court may actually have compounded the problem." Martin,
supra note 19, at 743.
51. Scott, 463 U.S. at 835-36. The Court characterized the lower court's logic as having three
parts: (1) the court described the Ku Klux Klan during the period following the Civil WarReconstruction-as "a political organization that sought to deprive a large segment of the
Southern population of political power and participation in the governance of those States and
of the Nation"; (2) the court reasoned that because Republicans were also objects of the Klan's
violence and conspiratorial activities, "Republicans in particular and political groups in general
were to be protected"; and (3) the court believed that because "animus against an economic
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to increased interference by federal courts with the activities of rival
political groups, rival campaign tactics, and exercises of free speech at
rival political meetings-interference the Court did not seem eager to
support.5 2 Although it noted that there was some support in section
1985(3)'s legislative history to reach beyond racial biases, 53 the Court
followed the lead set over a decade earlier in Griffin and left the issue
54
of political bias untouched.
D.

Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic

Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, decided ten years after
55
Scott, involved a battle between pro-choice and pro-life supporters.
Although the Court did not directly address whether political affiliation was protected under section 1985(3), it discussed what is required
to define a class and what types of animus are considered "invidious."'56 The plaintiffs57 sued to enjoin the defendants, Operation Rescue 58 and six individuals, from demonstrating at abortion clinics in the
Washington, D.C. area.5 9 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's determination that the defendants' actions were a conspiracy
to deprive women seeking abortions of their right to travel interstate
0
in violation of section 1985(3).6
In another five-to-four decision, the Court first rejected the district
court's determination that "women seeking abortion" could constitute
group... [was] 'closely akin' to the animus against political association," the animus against the
plaintiffs was sufficiently similar to political animus to fall under the statute. Id.
52. Justice White reasoned as follows:
[W]e find difficult the question whether § 1985(3) provided a remedy for every concerted effort by one political group to nullify the influence of or do other injury to a
competing group by use of otherwise unlawful means. . . . [Section] 1985(3) would
arguably reach the claim that a political party has interfered with the freedom of speech
of another political party by encouraging the heckling of its rival's speakers and the
disruption of the rival's meetings.
Id. at 836; see also infra notes 115, 135 (reciting more of Justice White's reasoning supporting this
proposition).
53. See infra note 115.
54. Scott, 463 U.S. at 837.
55. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
56. Id. at 269-74.
57. The plaintiffs were abortion clinics, pro-choice organizations, and members who may wish
to use the clinics. Id. at 266.
58. Operation Rescue organizes anti-abortion demonstrations that involve trespassing on, and
obstructing access to, the premises of abortion clinics. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 266-67. See also NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989),
affd per curiam, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993).

1062

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1053

an identifiable class for the purposes of section 1985(3).61 The Court
reasoned that a class could not be defined by "a group of individuals
who share a desire to engage in conduct that the section 1985(3) defendant disfavors," for this would convert the provision into the "general federal tort law" meant to be avoided. 6 2 The Court found that
the "animus" requirement necessitates a purpose that focuses upon
the class by reason of their class, for instance, discriminating against
women because they are women. 63 This requirement was not met, because the defendants defined their "rescues" with reference to abor64
tionists and the practice of abortion, not with reference to women.
Given that the discrimination was founded on opposition to abortion, and not to women, the Court thought that class-based animus
could only be found if either the defendants' "opposition to abortion
[could] reasonably be presumed to reflect a sex-based intent" or the
defendants' actual intent was irrelevant and animus could "be determined solely by effect. ' 65 The Court resolved the first issue by noting
that, while "[s]ome activities [are] such an irrational object of disfavor
that, if they are targeted, and if they also happen to be engaged in
exclusively or predominantly by a particular class of people, an intent
to disfavor that class can readily be presumed," opposition to abortion
was not such an activity. 66 The Court next responded to the second
proposition in the negative by looking to four equal protection
cases-two of which supported a finding that, for effect to imply intent, a decision must be made "at least in part 'because of,' not merely
'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group," 6 7 and two
61. Bray, 506 U.S. at 269.
62. Id.; accord United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 850 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe class must exist independently of the defendants' actions: that is, it
cannot be defined simply as the group of victims of the tortious action.").
63. Bray, 506 U.S. at 270. Justice Scalia. writing for the majority, provided the example of a
"purpose of 'saving' women because they are women from a combative, aggressive profession
such as the practice of law." Id. (emphasis in original).
64. Id.
65. Id. This second proposition was described as such: "that since voluntary abortion is actively engaged in only by women, to disfavor it is ipso facto to discriminate invidiously against
women as a class." Id. at 271.
66. Id. at 270. As an example, the Court stated that "[a] tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on
Jews," and a clear case in which disfavoring an activity would allow a presumption of intent to
disfavor a particular class. Id. The Court found that there were "common and respectable reasons for opposing [abortion], other than hatred of, or condescension toward (or indeed any view
at all concerning), women as a class." Id. This was supported by the fact that there were men
and women involved on both sides of the demonstrations. Id.
67. Id. at 271-72 (citing Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256. 279 (1979)). In addition
to Feeney, which sustained an equal protection challenge to a law giving employment preferences
to military veterans (over 98% of this class in Massachusetts were male), the Court also relied on
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), in which the Court rejected another sex-based equal
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other cases that "establish[ed] conclusively that [disfavoring abortion]
' 68
is not ipso facto sex discrimination.
The Court then looked to the use of "invidious" in Griffin's section
1985(3) requirements and concluded that the goal of preventing abortion did not qualify as "invidious" discrimination. Relying on Maher
v. Roe and Harris v. McRae,69 the Court found that the goal of
preventing abortion "[did] not remotely qualify for such harsh
description [as invidious], and for such derogatory association with racism."' 70 The Court proceeded to address and reject the plaintiffs' arguments that the defendants had interfered with their right to travel 71
and right to abortion, 72 as well as the dissent's argument that the
plaintiffs had established a violation under the "hindrance" clause of

protection challenge against a "state disability insurance system that denied coverage to certain
disabilities resulting from pregnancy." Bray, 506 U.S. at 271. The same principle espoused by
these cases applied to the "class-based invidiously discriminatory animus" requirement of section 1985(3)-"not because [the Court believed] that Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence is
automatically incorporated into § 1985(3), but rather because it is inherent in the requirement of
a class-based animus, i.e., an animus based on class." Id. at 272 & n.4 (emphasis in original).
68. Bray, 506 U.S. at 273. The Court relied on Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), which held that for cases involving "government abortion-funding restrictions," the Court would engage in ordinary rationality review, not the heightenedscrutiny that sex-based discrimination commanded. Bray, 506 U.S. at 273.
69. Bray, 506 U.S. at 274. The Court explained that, in Maher, it had reasoned that "'a value
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion' is proper and reasonable enough to be implemented
by the allocation of public funds." Id. (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474). In Harris, the Court
upheld Congress's decision to discriminate against abortion in a financial support and medical
procedures provision. Id. (citing Harris, 448 U.S. at 325).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 274-77. The Court found that the defendants' actions were meant to oppose abortion and that any impairment on the "right to travel" was an incidental consequence, not a
"conscious objective" as required for a conspiracy to be "for the purpose" of denying equal
protection. Id. at 275-76.
72. Id. at 277-78. The Court rejected this argument, because section 1985(3) "applies only to
[private] conspiracies that are 'aimed at interfering with rights ... protected against private, as
well as official, encroachment."' Id. at 278 (quoting Scott, 463 U.S. at 833). The Court had
previously only recognized the "right to be free from involuntary servitude" and the "right of
interstate travel" as such rights. Id. In concluding that the right to abortion was not in the same
category as these rights, the Court emphasized that (I) the right of abortion was one element of
a broader right of privacy or liberty and the other rights that had also been found within these
broader constitutional rights had not been afforded protection against private infringement; and
(2) because the Scott Court had refused to categorize the right to free speech-a right explicitly
protected in the Constitution-as protected against private interference, "it would be most peculiar to accord [the right to abortion] that preferred position, since it is much less explicitly protected by the Constitution." Id. at 278; see also Scott, 463 U.S. 830-33.
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that the plaintiffs had not estabsection 1985(3), 7 3 ultimately finding
74
lished a section 1985(3) claim.
III.

SUBJECT OPINION:

FARBER V. CITY OF PATERSON

This Part first sets forth Farber's relevant factual and procedural
history. 75 It then discusses Farber'sexamination of the plaintiff's section 1985(3) claim, 76 analyzing the court's conclusion that the plaintiff
had failed to allege an identifiable class under section 1985(3)77 and
discussing the Third Circuit's conclusion that a political discriminatory
78
animus is not invidious for of section 1985(3) purposes.
A.

Factual and ProceduralHistory

In Farberv. City of Paterson,79 Democratic candidate, Jose Torres,
defeated the incumbent Republican Mayor, Martin G. Barnes, in the
May 2002 mayoral election in Paterson, New Jersey.80 After his victory, Torres voiced his intent to terminate city employees who had
supported the former mayor.8 ' The plaintiff, Roberta Farber, a city
employee 82 and admitted supporter of the former mayor, was subsequently terminated in late June 2002.83
In response to her termination, Farber asked the American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3474
(the "Union") to file a grievance on her behalf for alleged breach of
84
the collective bargaining agreement governing her employment.
Union and city representatives met, but Farber's claim was rejected on
the basis that she was a provisional employee who could be fired at
73. Bray, 506 U.S. at 279-85. The "hindrance" clause of section 1985(3), as the Court in Bray
referred to it, "covers conspiracies for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted
authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or
Territory the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 279 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
74. Id. at 285.
75. See infra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 92-136 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 96-109 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 110-136 and accompanying text.
79. 440 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2006). The facts recited in this Note are the facts found in the Third
Circuit's opinion. For a more detailed discussion of the facts of this case, see the district court's
opinion in Farberv. City of Paterson, 327 F. Supp. 2d 401, 403-06 (D.N.J. 2004).
80. Farber, 440 F.3d at 132-33.
81. Id. at 133.
82. Farber was hired in or about 1991, became the Assistant Director for Economic and Industrial Development in or about 1994. and held this position until her termination. Farber,327
F. Supp. 2d at 403. The Third Circuit referred to this position as an "administrative, non-policymaking position." Farber,440 F.3d at 133.
83. Farber, 440 F.3d at 133.
84. Id.
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will.85 Farber alleged that, after the meeting, the Union president,
who also happened to be a political ally of Torres, was then appointed
86
as the city's Director of Public Works.
Farber's subsequent suit against the city and the Union, among
others, alleged that the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy to deprive her of her First Amendment rights because of her political affiliation in violation of section 1985(3).87 Farber's suit also included a
claim that the Union breached the duty of fair representation it owed
her under the state constitution and the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act. 88 The Union moved to dismiss, arguing that
discrimination based on political affiliation could not support a section
1985(3) claim.8 9
The district court denied the motion to dismiss, determining that
political affiliation was a cognizable class under section 1985(3) and
that "Farber [pled] sufficient class-based animus when she alleged that
Defendants conspired against her because she is a Republican." 90 The
Union moved for an interlocutory appeal of the denial of the motion
to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion, certifying the
question of whether "people who share a political affiliation [are] a
cognizable class for § 1985(3) purposes." 91

85. Id. The Third Circuit explained in a footnote that the New Jersey Civil Service Act governed public employment in Paterson and distinguished between permanent employees and
those who are provisionally employed. Id. at 133 n.1. Despite the requirement that a provisional appointment could not last longer than twelve months, Farber remained a provisional
employee for her entire employment-eleven years-because the city allegedly failed to complete the process that would have changed her status to permanent. Id.
86. Id. at 133.
87. Id.
88. Id. The Third Circuit's discussion of the duty of fair representation claim is outside the
scope of this Note, and this claim will not be addressed further. Therefore, it is sufficient to
mention that the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that the claim fell under a
six-year statute of limitations, and thus the Union's motion to dismiss the claim was properly
denied. Id. at 145.
89. Farber,440 F.3d at 133.
90. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Farber v. City of Paterson, 327 F. Supp. 2d 401, 424-25
(D.N.J. 2004)). The district court had relied on a previous district court case, Perez v. Cucci, 725
F. Supp. 209 (D.N.J. 1989), affd, 898 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1990), in reaching its conclusion. Farber,
440 F.3d at 133. In Perez, a former police officer alleged that his civil rights were violated when
he was demoted, because he supported the candidacy of a mayoral incumbent who lost his reelection bid. 725 F. Supp. at 212. After a detailed discussion regarding section 1985(3), see id. at
248-53, the court found that "§ 1985(3) sanctions politically motivated conspiracies, and consequently allows those injured by conduct of the conspirators to obtain relief for injuries they
caused." Id. at 253.
91. Farber, 440 F.3d at 134.
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The Third Circuit's Discussion of Section 1985(3)

The Third Circuit began its review of the issue by setting out the
four requirements for a section 1985(3) claim established first by Griffin and later refined by Scott.92 The court went on to briefly describe
section 1985(3)'s background, from its initial inclusion in the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871 to Griffin, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a section 1985(3) claim can reach private, as well as public, conspiracies. 9 3 The court also noted Griffin's requirement that a claimant
allege "'some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action' in order to state a
claim."'9 4 The Third Circuit then defined the test that would instruct
the case before it: a plaintiff must allege (1) "that the conspiracy was
motivated by discriminatory animus against an identifiable class"; and
(2) "that the discrimination against the identifiable class was
95
invidious.
1.

Farber Failed to Satisfy the Identifiable Class Requirement

In analyzing the first prong of its two-part test, the Farber court,
relying on language found in Bray, first found that "§ 1985(3) defendants must have allegedly conspired against a group that has an identifiable existence independent of the fact that its members are victims
of the defendants' tortious conduct. ' 96 The court explained that this
independent existence preserved the distinction between the requirements that, in a section 1985(3) claim, the "conspirators be motivated
92. Id.
93. Id. at 134-35.
94. Id. at 135 (emphasis in original) (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)).
95. Id. The court relied on Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1996), for formulating
this test. At the time Farber was decided, Aulson was the most recent circuit case involving
section 1985(3) and political affiliation. In Aulson, the plaintiff alleged that municipal officeholders in his town subjected him to illegal searches, giving rise to a section 1985(3) claim, because the plaintiff was a "member[ ] of a political group which supports candidates who oppose
the politics of the [officeholders]." Id. at 2 (first alteration in original). The First Circuit did not
decide whether political classes were covered by section 1985(3), instead ruling against the plaintiff, because the class the plaintiff proposed did not constitute a cognizable class. Id. at 4. The
Aulson court found the plaintiff's proposed class not cognizable, because it could not be characterized "as an identifiable segment of the community by reference to any objective criteria" and
because it was defined "with reference to what it opposes ... rather than with reference to what
it espouses." Id. at 6.
96. Farber, 440 F.3d at 136. The language relied upon from Bray stated the following:
"[Cilass" unquestionably connotes something more than a group of individuals who
share a desire to engage in conduct that the § 1985(3) defendant disfavors. Otherwise,
innumerable tort plaintiffs would be able to assert causes of action under § 1985(3) by
simply defining the aggrieved class as those seeking to engage in the activity the defendant has interfered with.
Id. at 135-36 (quoting Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269 (1993)).
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by class-based invidiously discriminatory animus and that the plaintiff
be the victim of an injury he . . . seeks to remedy by means of
§ 1985(3)."97 To satisfy the "independent identifiable existence" requirement, the court set out an objective test: "a reasonable person
must be able to 'readily determine by means of an objective.., set of
criteria who is a member of the group and who is not."' 98
After briefly illustrating the decisions in Bray and Aulson, in which
the U.S. Supreme Court and the First Circuit, respectively, found that
the alleged classes at issue in those cases were not identifiable, 99 the
Third Circuit turned to its own jurisprudence and recognized that it
had previously deemed women' 0 0 and persons with mental retardationlol to be objectively identifiable classes. 10 2 The court further observed that, when groups are deemed distinguishable based on
immutable characteristics-such as race, sex, and mental disabilitythey are considered so objectively identifiable that no extended analysis is needed.10 3 However, when mutable characteristics, such as opinion or conduct, are used to define a class, the court found that
10 4
determining an objectively identifiable class is not so simple.
The court then applied the standards previously mentioned to Farber's claims and concluded that the district court "erred when it concluded that 'Farber [pled] sufficient class-based animus when she
alleged that Defendants conspired against her because she is a Republican."1 0 5 The court explained that Farber did not satisfy the pleading
requirement, because Farber neither alleged that she was a Republican nor alleged that the supposed conspiracy was motivated by a desire to discriminate against Republicans. 106 Farber had only alleged
that her termination was caused by her support for and affiliation with
the former mayor, who was later identified as a Republican. 10 7 Nor
did she allege that her support or injury was founded upon the
97. Id. The court went on to explain that if merely alleging injury sought to be remedied by
section 1985(3) could satisfy the class-based animus, "'the requirement of class-based animus
would be drained of all meaningful content,"' id. (quoting Aulson. 83 F.3d at 5), and this "would
transform § 1985(3) into the 'general federal tort law' Congress did not intend to enact." Id.
(quoting Bray, 506 U.S. at 269).
98. Id. (quoting Aulson, 83 F.3d at 5-6).
99. See supra notes 61-62, 95 and accompanying text.
100. See Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated
on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
101. See Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682 (3d Cir. 1997).
102. Farber,440 F.3d at 137.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (alteration and emphasis in original).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 137-38.
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mayor's political affiliation. 10 In concluding that Farber's attempt to
define a class was "so subjectively defined and 'wholly indeterminate"' that it could not meet the "independent identifiable existence"
requirement, the Third Circuit explained that there were "differences
between being discriminated against because of membership in a political party and being discriminated against because of support for the
policies of a politician who also happens to be a member of the party,"
though it declined to define those differences. 10 9
2. Political DiscriminatoryAnimus is Not "Invidious"
Instead of resolving the case solely on Farber's failure to allege an
identifiable class, the court also discussed whether Farber's claim of
discrimination based on her political affiliation was so invidious as to
qualify for section 1985(3) protection.1 10 The court's analysis began
by stating the two guideposts set out by the U.S. Supreme Court for
considering section 1985(3) claims: (1) a conspiracy motivated by racial discrimination is actionable under section 1985(3);111 and (2) a
conspiracy motivated by economic or commercial animus is not actionable under section 1985(3).112 The court went on to acknowledge
the mixed signals that the Third Circuit itself had sent to its district
courts concerning the issue of discriminatory animus directed at a political class1 13 and also recognized the split among the courts of ap108. Farber, 440 F.3d at 138.
109. Id. Thus, the Farber court did not hold that a class based on political affiliation could
never pass the "independent identifiable existence" requirement, but perhaps indicated that registration with a certain party would be necessary. See also infra notes 161-164 and accompanying text.
110. Farber,440 F.3d at 138. In moving past Farber's failure to allege an identifiable class and
onto the issue of whether political discrimination is invidious, the Third Circuit ultimately decided an issue that it technically did not have to resolve, and one that its circuit had not yet
conclusively decided. This deserves commendation, considering that, in at least four prior opportunities, the Third Circuit declined to address the question of political discrimination under
section 1985(3). See, e.g., Stephens v. Kerrigan, 122 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1997); Robison v. Canterbury Vill., Inc., 848 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1988): C & K Coal Co. v. UMWA, 704 F.2d 690 (3d Cir.
1983); Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980).
111. Farber, 440 F.3d at 138 (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88. 102 (1971)).
112. Id. (citing United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 838 (1983)).
113. Id. at 138-39. The court compared its affirmation of Perez v. Cucci, 725 F. Supp. 209
(D.N.J. 1989), affd, 898 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1990), which held that political affiliation was a cognizable class under section 1985(3), with several other affirmations of district court opinions in
which the district court held that political affiliation did not qualify as a class pursuant to section
1985(3). See, e.g., D'Aurizio v. Palisades Park, 963 F. Supp. 378 (D.N.J. 1997), affd, 151 F.3d
1024 (3d Cir. 1998); Stephens v. Kerrigan, No. CIV.-A.-95-615, 1996 WL 256581 (E.D. Pa. May
15, 1996), affd on other grounds, 122 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1997); Deblasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 820 F. Supp. 876 (D.N.J. 1993). affd in part, rev'd in part, 53 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 1995).
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peals. 1 " 4 The court determined that political discriminatory animus
was not invidious on two grounds: (1) although Congress had acknowledged in 1871 that Republicans were victims of racially motivated violence, this did not mean that section 1985(3) was meant to
reach victims of political discrimination; and (2) the nature of political
discrimination was not sufficiently "irrational and odious" to be considered invidious."15
The Farber court found that, by relying upon Perez v. Cucci, the
lower court had thereby actually relied upon the Second Circuit's preScott decision of Keating v. Carey,116 which had held that section
114. Farber, 440 F.3d at 139. The court identified three appellate court approaches: (1) four
courts held that discrimination based on political affiliation was actionable under section
1985(3), see Conklin v. Lovely, 834 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1987); Galloway v. Louisiana, 817 F.2d
1154 (5th Cir. 1987); Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1983); and Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d
833 (8th Cir. 1975); (2) two courts held that discrimination based on political affiliation was not
actionable under section 1985(3), see Grimes v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1359 (7th Cir. 1985); and Harrison v. KVAT Food Management, Inc., 766 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1985); and (3) three courts did not
address the issue, see Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996); Schultz v. Sundberg, 759
F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1985); and Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
115. Farber,440 F.3d at 140-43 (quoting Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584
F.2d 1235, 1243 (3d Cir. 1978)). In prefacing its discussion of whether political discrimination
was invidious, the Farber court stated that dicta in Scott suggested how the Supreme Court
"would rule if squarely faced with the issue." Id. at 139. In determining that the Court would
rule against political affiliation being a cognizable class, the court noted that the Scott Court was
"unpersuaded" by the Fifth Circuit's reasoning that political groups were to be protected based
on the legislative history of section 1985(3). Id. (citing Scott, 463 U.S. at 835-38). The court
went on to quote the Scott Court's explanation:
[l]t is a close question whether § 1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based animus
other than animus against [African Americans] and those who championed their cause,
most notably Republicans. The central theme of the bill's proponents was that the
Klan and others were forcibly resisting efforts to emancipate [African Americans] and
give them equal access to political power. The predominant purpose of § 1985(3) was
to combat the prevalent animus against [African Americans] and their supporters. The
latter included Republicans generally, as well as others, such as Northerners who came
South with sympathetic views towards [African Americans].
Id. (quoting Scott, 463 U.S. at 836). The court also noted that the Scott Court acknowledged a
statement made by Senator Edmunds during the debate over the Ku Klux Klan Act that a person discriminated against "'because he was a Democrat ... or because he was a Catholic, or
because he was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter"' would have a cause of action
under section 1985(3). Id. at 139 n.8 (quoting Scott, 463 U.S. at 836-37). However, the Scott
Court quickly discounted this statement, because it was made by a senator and the bill and its
amendments originated in the House of Representatives, not the Senate. Id.
116. 706 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1983). In Keating, the plaintiff alleged that he was fired from his
state civil service position because, inter alia, he was a Republican. Id. at 380. The district court
had initially dismissed the plaintiff's federal claims, because he had "failed to allege that the
defendants acted from a class-based discriminatory motive." Id. at 381. Interestingly, Keating
was decided just three months before Scott. Although the Farbercourt partially disagreed with
Keating's reasoning, because it was pre-Scott and therefore decided without the benefit of Scott's
suggestive dicta, the court noted that despite Scott's dicta, the Second Circuit had re-affirmed
Keating post-Scott in N.Y. State NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1359 (2d Cir. 1989). Farber, 440
F.3d at 140 n.9. However, Terry's post-Scott approval of Keating might be more accurately at-
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1985(3) was meant to "provide all victims of political animus with a
cause of action" and emphasized "the repeated statements of the 42d
Congress that Ku Klux Klan hostility towards 'Republicans' must
end." 117 The Keating court reasoned that the Klan was a political organization in 1871 and sought to inflict violence not only upon African
Americans, but also upon "Republicans." '"1 8 The Keating court buttressed its reasoning with other circuits' findings that political discrimination was prohibited by section 1985(3). 119 Ultimately, the Keating
court concluded that Congress sought to "prohibit political discrimi0
nation in general."12
The Farbercourt disagreed with that conclusion. 121 The Third Circuit reasoned that the fact that many victims of the Klan's racially
motivated violence were Republicans did not "mean that the discriminatory animus was because they were Republicans.' 2 2 The court
tributed to Scott's refusal to explicitly address political affiliation, a refusal that has forced courts
to rely on pre-Scon decisions, contributing to the circuit split on this issue. Compare Conklin.
834 F.2d at 549 (recognizing that it was "not writing on a clean slate" as other circuits might have
been in "restrict[ing] section 1985(3) to conspiracies directed towards racial classes" in post-Scott
decisions because of a pre-Scott decision, Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973), which
held that section 1985(3) reached classes such as "supporters of a political candidate"), with
Harrison, 766 F.2d 155 (engaging in an independent section 1985(3) analysis, because it was not
bound by precedent and ultimately holding that Republicans are not a protected class): see also
infra notes 202-207 and accompanying text.
117. Farber,440 F.3d at 140 (citing Keating, 706 F.2d at 387). The Keating court cited seven
statements made by members of Congress during debate over the Ku Klux Klan Act that specifically linked Klan violence to Republicans. Keating, 706 F.2d at 387-88. An example of a statement quoted by the Keating court is "[E]very victim of Ku Klux outrage has been a Republican."
Id. at 387 (alteration in original).
118. Farber,440 F.3d at 140 (citing Keating, 706 F.2d at 387). The Keating court explained that
the "current perception of the Klan as a racist organization" would distort the view of the Ku
Klux Klan Act, because, in 1871, the Klan was viewed not only as a racist organization, but also
as a "political organization intent on establishing Democratic hegemony in the South." Keating,
706 F.2d at 387.
119. Keating, 706 F.2d at 388: see, e.g., Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975); Glasson
v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1975); Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir.
1973).
120. Farber,440 F.3d at 140 (quoting Keating, 706 F.2d at 387). Accordingly, the Keating court
held that the plaintiff's allegations satisfied the requirement of class-based discriminatory animus. Keating, 706 F.2d at 387-88. Additionally, the court saw the invidious discrimination requirement as separate from the class-based requirement and did not address whether the
defendant's conduct was "the sort of invidious deprivation of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities sanctioned by [section 1985(3)]." Id. at 388 n.18. Judge Meskill dissented
from the majority opinion as to its conclusion regarding the section 1985(3) claim, finding the
majority's interpretation of section 1985(3) too expansive and characterizing the termination at
issue as merely an example of political patronage that the 1871 Congress never intended to
address with the Ku Klux Klan Act. Id. at 388 (Meskill, J., concurring and dissenting). See also
infra note 135.
121. Farber, 440 F.3d at 140.
122. Id. at 141 (emphasis in original).
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found Bray instructive. In Bray, the Court concluded that, although
the only victims of the conspiracy motivated by opposition to abortion
were women, this did not mean that the discriminatory animus experienced was motivated by the person's sex. 123 Thus, the Farber court
found that the repeated statements in the legislative history indicating
Congressional intent to protect Republicans did not mean that
"Republicans victimized by animus directed against Republicans can
ride the coattails of Republicans victimized by animus directed against
African-Americans." 124 The Court instead supported the view that a
section 1985(3) plaintiff "need not be a member of the class against
125
which a conspiracy directs its invidiously discriminatory animus."
The Farbercourt went further, noting that the Third Circuit's decision
in Novotny v. Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n explained that section 1985(3) did not require that the person injured
"have any relationship to the 'person or class of persons' which the
conspiracy seeks to deprive of equal protection, privileges or
1 26
immunities."
After determining that the legislative history of section 1985(3) did
not support protecting political classes, the Farbercourt delved into an
independent determination of whether discrimination based on political affiliation is "invidious in the same way that discrimination directed at African Americans is invidious."'1 27 The court first looked to
the meaning of the word "invidious" and the context in which the
Griffin Court used the word. 128 Looking to Bray, the Farber court
then rationalized that, if the goal of preventing abortion did not qualify as invidious discrimination, then "neither [did] the goal of replac123. Id. (citing Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1993)).
124. Id.
125. Id. To show the circuit's agreement with this view, the Farbercourt cited to Richardson
v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247, 1249 (3d Cir. 1971), which found that a nonminority victim of racially
discriminatory animus could state a section 1985(3) claim. Farber, 440 F.3d at 141. The court
also noted that Richardson was cited approvingly in a post-Scott decision, Robison v. Canterbury
Village, Inc., 848 F.2d 424, 431 n.7 (3d Cir. 1988). Farber,440 F.3d at 141 n.11.
126. Farber,440 F.3d at 141 (citing Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d
1235, 1244 (3d Cir. 1978). In Novotny, the Third Circuit "held that a male victim of sexually
discriminatory animus directed at women could state a § 1985(3) claim." Id. (emphasis in
original).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 142. The court looked at the Supreme Court's explanation in Bray of "[tihe nature
of the 'individuously discriminatory animus' Griffin had in mind." Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Bray, 506 U.S. at 274). The Bray Court defined "invidious" as "tending to excite
odium, ill will, or envy: likely to give offense; esp., unjustly and irritatingly discriminating," Bray,
506 U.S. at 274 (citing WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1306 (2d ed. 1954)). The Bray

Court also took into account the Griffin Court's use of the phrase "some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based" before its use of "invidiously." Bray, 506 U.S. at 274.
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ing, with one's own, members of an opposing political party in an
29
exercise of classic political patronage."'
The court then analyzed the distinction between discrimination motivated by immutable characteristics and that motivated by mutable
characteristics. 130 Past circuit decisions had "emphasized the 'irrational and odious' nature of discrimination motivated by a class's immutable characteristics because such characteristics are 'determined
by the accident of birth' and 'bear[ ] no relation to ability to perform
or contribute to society.' "131 The court again noted the circuit's prior
decisions finding invidious discrimination where the discrimination
was based on immutable characteristics 132 and concluded that, assuming that discrimination "motivated by a mutable characteristic" could
be invidious, political affiliation was not one of those
characteristics. 133
In concluding its analysis regarding Farber's section 1985(3) claim,
the court briefly discussed the possible implications should politically
motivated conspiracies be vulnerable under section 1985(3). 134 It concluded that this "would involve the federal courts in policing the political arena in ways that the drafters of § 1985(3) could not have
intended."1 35 The court then held that "§ 1985(3) does not provide a
cause of action for individuals allegedly injured by conspiracies moti129. Farber, 440 F.3d at 142. The Bray Court had concluded that "'the goal of preventing
abortion . . . in itself . . . does not remotely qualify for such harsh description, and for such

derogatory association with racism."' Bray, 506 U.S. at 274.
130. Id.
131. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Novotny, 584 F.2d at 1243).
132. See Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682 (3d Cir. 1997) (discrimination directed toward mentally
handicapped); Novotny, 584 F.2d 1235 (discrimination directed toward women).
133. Farber,440 F.3d at 142. The Farbercourt noted that political patronage sometimes has a
rational basis, whereas racial discrimination will never have a rational basis. Id. at 142 n.12.
134. Id. at 142.
135. Id. The court relied on observations by Judge Pollak in Nilan v. De Meo, 575 F. Supp.
1225 (E.D. Pa. 1983), Judge Meskill in Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1983) (Meskill, J.,
concurring and dissenting), and Justice White in United Bhd. of Carpenters,Local 610 v. Scott,
463 U.S. 825 (1983). Judge Pollak explained that "political patronage 'plays a major role in all
politics,' and . . . 'it can be reasonably assumed that private political actors will continue to press
government officials to exercise such partisan leeway as the hiring and firing processes still permit, conformably with the [Supreme] Court's decisions."' Farber, 440 F.3d at 142 (quoting Nilan, 575 F. Supp. at 1227). Judge Meskill observed that "[p]ermitting § 1985(3) to reach
politically motivated conspiracies would effectively outlaw all terminations based on political
affiliation" and that "[it is unlikely that Congress 'contemplated that the Civil Rights Act would
strike the death knell to a way of political life that flourished then and remains an accepted
incident of elective office."' Id. (quoting Keating, 706 F.2d at 394 (Meskill, J., concurring and
dissenting)). Justice White stated that the extension of section 1985(3) to conspiracies motivated
by political affiliation would "'go far toward making the federal courts . . . the monitors of
campaign tactics in both state and federal elections, a role that the courts should not be quick to
assume."' Id. at 142-43 (quoting Scott, 463 U.S. at 836).
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vated by discriminatory animus directed toward their political
36
affiliation."1
IV.

ANALYSIS

This Part analyzes Farber and explains the present state of section
1985(3) jurisprudence with respect to political affiliation. It first explores the minimal precedent binding on the Farber court and critiques the reasoning behind the court's conclusion. 137 This Part then
concludes by examining whether the Third Circuit correctly decided
Farber-aquestion answered in the affirmative-by considering some
impediments courts face when deciding section 1985(3) cases, including a lack of both U.S. Supreme Court guidance and uniform interpretation of section 1985(3)'s legislative history, as well as various
analyses that have been proposed as solutions to the section 1985(3)
13 8
puzzle.
A.

Critique of Farber

One cannot fully comprehend Farber without understanding the
backdrop against which the Third Circuit decided the fate of political
affiliation under section 1985(3). Thus, before it examines the Farber
opinion, this Section discusses Supreme Court and circuit court precedent regarding political affiliation and cognizable classes under section 1985(3).
1. Prior Cases
As previously stated, and as noted in opinions by the different circuits, Supreme Court precedent regarding whether political affiliation
is a cognizable class has been scant and noncommittal. 139 In Scott, the
lone Supreme Court decision to discuss whether section 1985(3) pro136. Farber, 440 F.3d at 143.
137. See infra notes 139-193 and accompanying text.
138. See infra notes 194-247 and accompanying text.
139. Since its watershed decision in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), in which the
Court revitalized the use of section 1985(3) by holding that the statute -applies to public and
private conspiracies alike and required a conspiracy motivated by a class-based,,invidiously discriminatory animus, the Court has delivered few decisions substantively determining section
1985(3)'s scope. See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) (holding that "women seeking abortion" is not a protected class and discussing what constitutes an
identifiable class); United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983) (holding
that economic or commercial classes are not protected); Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979) (holding that deprivation of a right created by Title VII cannot be
the basis for a cause of action under section 1985(3)). See also supra note 114 (listing appellate
court decisions coming to different conclusions regarding the protection of political affiliation
under section 1985(3)).

1074

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1053

vides refuge for political affiliation, the majority opinion explicitly
withheld judgment on that issue. 140 Although it is debatable what the
majority's discussion regarding section 1985(3) and political affiliation
suggests, 141 the discussion, nevertheless, consists of dicta that are not
142
binding on lower courts.

In addition to the absence of a definitive statement by the Court
regarding political affiliation and section 1985(3), the Farber panel
was faced with inconsistent circuit precedent. 143 On the one hand, the
Third Circuit had affirmed a post-Scott district court decision, 144 holding that "political affiliation qualifies as a § 1985(3) class.' 1 45 On the
other hand, the Third Circuit had also affirmed post-Scott district
court decisions refusing to recognize a section 1985(3) claim based on
political affiliation. 1 46 Moreover, in two post-Scott decisions, the
Third Circuit had explicitly declined to address discrimination based
upon political affiliation.' 4 7 Therefore, the Farber court was faced
140. Scott, 463 U.S. at 835-37. The Court "[did] not affirm" the circuit court's decision that
section 1985(3) "reache[d] conspiracies other than those motivated by racial basis." Id. at 835.
141. Compare Durden, supra note 50, at 208 ("Paradoxically, the Court's analysis in Scott
lends support to both sides of the issue of political party members as a protected class."), with
Conklin v. Lovely, 834 F.2d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 1987) ("Admittedly, [Scott] raises doubts about the
legitimacy of plaintiff's claims [based on political support for a Democrat] ...."),Grimes v.
Smith, 776 F.2d 1359, 1366 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[Scott] is a powerful indication that, when squarely
confronted with the question, the Court would not include [purely political] conspiracies within
the scope of [section 1985(3)]."), and Harrison v. KVAT Food Mgmt., Inc., 766 F.2d 155, 161 (4th
Cir. 1985) ("In analyzing the Scott decision, we find little support for the contention that
§ 1985(3) includes in its scope of protection the victims of purely political conspiracies."). See
also supra note 50.
142. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1997) (noting that statements in dicta
do not constitute binding precedent).
143. Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 138-39 (3d Cir. 2006). The court admitted to
sending "mixed signals as to whether discriminatory animus directed at a class based on political
affiliation can also so qualify." Id. at 138.
144. Perez v. Cucci, 725 F. Supp. 209 (D.N.J. 1989), affd, 898 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1990).
145. Farber,440 F.3d at 138 (citing Perez, 725 F. Supp. at 253). The district court judge, in
deciding Perez, agreed with the Second Circuit's analysis in Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377 (2d
Cir. 1983), and apparently looked to Keating, because the Third Circuit had cited approvingly to
Keating in a post-Scott decision, Robison v. Canterbury Village, Inc., 848 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1988).
See Perez. 725 F. Supp. at 250, 252.
146. Farber,440 F.3d at 137-38; see supra note 113.
147. See Stephens v. Kerrigan, 122 F.3d 171, 184 (3d Cir. 1997) (denying a section 1985(3)
claim for failure to show a conspiracy and forgoing the decision of whether private conspiracies
to discriminate on nonracial factors are prohibited by section 1985(3)); Robison, 848 F.2d at 430
n.7. This decision to "reserve comment" was also made in two pre-Scott decisions. See C & K
Coal Co. v. UMWA, 704 F.2d 690, 700 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[W]e need not attempt to resolve the
interesting issues which divided the ...Fifth Circuit [in Scott] and has now attracted the attention of the Supreme Court."); Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 697 (3d Cir. 1980) ("We
need not decide today whether § 1985(3) embraces private conspiracies to discriminate on the
basis of factors other than race."). Although these cases address private conspiracies, the private-public conspiracy distinction has no bearing on whether political affiliation is a protected
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with circuit precedent indicating that a decision directly addressing the
issue of whether political affiliation was under the reach of section
1985(3) was long overdue.
2.

The Farber Court's Reasoning

Because of the Third Circuit's muddled precedent regarding section
1985(3) and political affiliation, the Farbercourt sought guidance from
the most recent appellate court decision, Aulson v. Blanchard;148 the
most recent Supreme Court decision addressing what constitutes a
"class" under section 1985(3), Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic;149 as well as the Supreme Court's decision in United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott.150 The Farbercourt embarked
on a two-part analysis, derived from Aulson, in which it first determined (1) whether the discriminatory animus was against an identifiable class, before it moved on to determine (2) whether the
discrimination was invidious. 15 1 This is a sensible approach, because,
before Griffin's requirement of "class-based, invidiously discrimina53
tory animus"' 5 2 can be satisfied, a distinctive class must first exist.
a.

Attacking the "Identifiable Class" Question

The Farber court turned to Bray and Aulson to structure its analysis
under the first prong, a54 because it conceded that circuit precedent
had often addressed the second prong without addressing "the predicate question of whether an objectively identifiable class existed in the
first place."'1 55 With its framework in place, the Farber court found
class. Cf. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[A]n unforced reading of § 1985(3)
affords no principled basis for distinguishing between public and private conspiracies.").
148. 83 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996).
149. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
150. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
151. Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Aulson, 83 F.3d at
4-5.
152. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
153. See Farber, 440 F.3d at 135 ("[T~he allegation of a 'class-based animus' naturally
presumes that there is a specific, identifiable class against whom the defendants can have
discriminated.").
154. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
155. Farber, 440 F.3d at 137. The court recognized that it had previously extended section
1985(3) to women in Novotny v. Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235
(3d Cir. 1978), and the mentally retarded in Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682 (3d Cir. 1997). In
applying section 1985(3) to the mentally retarded, the court "assum[ed], albeit implicitly, that
the mentally retarded constitute an objectively identifiable class in the first place." Farber, 440
F.3d at 137. However, one could argue that the circuit's characterization of the "mentally retarded" as an "objectively identifiable class" ignores the reality that a "mentally retarded" class
would consist of people having a wide range of intellectual capabilities. In City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), the Court held that mental retardation was not
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the plaintiff's complaint insufficient, because, among other things, the
plaintiff did not allege that her support for the former mayor, or her
56
termination, was due to the former mayor's status as a Republican.
However, one could argue that, in a political patronage situationwhich the court admitted this was' 5 7-a newly elected politician's dismissal of the incumbent's employees is always based, at least in some
part, on the former officeholder's political affiliation, because, in most
elections, candidates running against each other are of different political affiliations.1 58 While it is true that the plaintiff's support of the
former mayor cannot automatically be attributed to his Republican
status, 159 it seems a bit of a stretch for the Third Circuit not to reasonably infer an allegation of termination based on the former mayor's
160
Republican status.
Nevertheless, the court found that there were "differences between
being discriminated against because of membership in a political party
and being discriminated against because of support for the policies of
a politician who also happens to be a member of the party."1 61 It
concluded that the plaintiff's putative class was not objectively determinative. 162 Unfortunately, the court declined to discuss these differences and why they would be relevant to defining a proper class,
a quasi-suspect classification deserving of heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause. In so concluding, the Court noted that the mentally retarded "range from those whose
disability is not immediately evident to those who must be constantly cared for," falling "into
four distinct categories." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 & n.9. The Court also referred to the mentally retarded as a "large and amorphous class" and stated that "[tihey are thus different, immutably so, in relevant respects." Id. at 442, 445. Although Cleburnewas an equal protection case,
it is probative as to what the Supreme Court would consider an "objectively identifiable class"
for purposes of section 1985(3). As the Lake court admitted, in referring to its previous holding
in Novotny, "[o]ur holding which declined to 'truncat[e] [the] sweep' of section 1985(3) is buttressed by the fact that 'comparable Reconstruction civil rights legislation such as the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has no such boundaries."' Lake, 112 F.3d at
686-87 (alterations in original) (quoting Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282, 294 (S.D.N.Y.
1993)).
156. Farber,440 F.3d at 138. See also supra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
157. Farber, 440 F.3d at 132 ("We have before us a classic example of political patronage.").
158. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 353 (1976) ("[The] practice of dismissing employees on
a partisan basis is but one form of the general practice of political patronage."). Of course, in
primary elections, a member of one party may run against an incumbent of the same party
however, this was not the situation in Farber.
159. Indeed, the plaintiff's complaint alleged that the "[p]laintiff was a public supporter and
advocate of the policies of [the mayor]" and that "[s]he believed [the mayor's] policies were
good for the city of Paterson and openly expressed herself to that effect." Farber,440 F.3d at
137 n.5.
160. The court accepted "facts alleged in the complaint and the reasonable inferences that can
be drawn from those facts" as true "for purposes of ... review." Id. at 134.
161. Id. at 138.
162. Id.
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which leaves one to speculate as to the distinction that makes the former capable of being defined as a class and the latter incapable of the
same. A possible explanation for the distinction is that membership in
a party, so long as one is registered, is easily determined. Although
registered members of a political party may agree with different policies, the registration process makes the class easily identifiable; one is
either a registered Republican or not a registered Republican. This
satisfies the requirement espoused in Farberthat objective criteria are
needed to define a class. 163 Defining a class based upon support of
another's policies, on the other hand, requires defining a class by the
to the
conduct in which those persons are engaged, a result contrary
164
teaching of Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic.
b.

Is Political Discrimination Invidious?

Farberstands out among section 1985(3) jurisprudence, because the
Third Circuit determined whether discrimination motivated by political affiliation was invidious, despite the plaintiff's failure to establish a
class. 165 In doing so, the Farberpanel resisted the urge to dispose of a
case on the simplest grounds and stood firm against the "this question
16 6
we leave for another day" logic.
In discussing the issue of invidious discrimination, the Farbercourt
expressly disagreed with the Second Circuit's reading of the legislative
history of the Ku Klux Klan Act in Keating v. Carey,t 67 instead relying
upon the dicta in United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 610 v.
Scott168 and its own interpretation of the legislative history, which was
partially based upon Judge Meskill's concurrence and dissent in Keating.169 In interpreting the legislative history, the court persuasively
analogized post-Civil War violence against Republicans to the opposition to abortion at issue in Bray. t 70 Just as the fact that the "victims of
a conspiracy motivated by opposition to abortion were all women did
not mean that the discriminatory animus they faced was [based on
sex],' 17' the fact that the majority of people attacked by the Klan
163. Id. at 136. As previously noted, the Farber court did not hold that a class based on
political affiliation could never be an identifiable class. See supra note 109 and accompanying
text.
164. 506 U.S. 263, 269 (1993).
165. Farber, 440 F.3d at 138-43.
166. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
167. 706 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1983).
168. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
169. Farber, 440 F.3d at 140-43.
170. Id. at 141.
171. Id. (citing Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1993)).

1078

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1053

were Republicans did not evidence a political animus, but rather a
racial odium, because Republicans were involved in gaining civil
rights for African Americans. The court continued this reasoning in
noting "that a § 1985(3) plaintiff need not be a member of the class
against which a conspiracy directs its invidiously discriminatory animus.' 72 The court found that the legislative history underscored this
view 173-that the Republicans would be protected by the Act because
of their support for African Americans, and not because of their political affiliation-as a logical application of this principle. In further
interpreting the legislative history, the Farbercourt stated that reading
section 1985(3) to protect Republicans because of their political affili7 4
ation would be to remove it from its historical context.1
Turning to whether discrimination based on political affiliation was
invidious, the Farbercourt first looked to Bray and reasoned that, because opposition to abortion is not invidious, an "exercise of classic
political patronage" is "surely" not invidious.1 75 However, this statement is problematic. First, the court gave no reason for this analogy.
It reasoned that political patronage sometimes has a rational basis in
that "[a] new administration is justified in replacing policymaking employees with members of its own party in order to ensure 'that representative government not be undercut by tactics obstructing the
implementation of policies of the new administration.' "176 However,
the decision that the court cited for this proposition, Elrod v. Burns,
largely emphasized how political patronage pales in comparison to
one's First Amendment rights and, in fact, established limits on political patronage.1 7 7 One could also contend that the right to political
expression or affiliation is a stronger constitutional right than the right
to an abortion. The right to political expression is explicitly contained
in the First Amendment, whereas the right to an abortion is "less explicitly protected by the Constitution," because it is "one element of a
172. Id. (citing Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247, 1249 (3d Cir. 1971)).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 140 n.10 (citing Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 393-94 (2d Cir. 1983) (Meskill, J.,
concurring and dissenting)).
175. Farber, 440 F.3d at 142.
176. Id. at 142 n.12 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976)).
177. The Elrod plurality opinion held that the political patronage dismissal of a "nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee" was unconstitutional. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 375.
The plurality believed in the limited utility of political patronage compared to First Amendment
rights: "[T]he gain to representative government provided by the practice of patronage, if any,
would be insufficient to justify its sacrifice of First Amendment rights." Id. at 370; see also id. at
356 ("Our concern with the impact of patronage on political belief and association does not
occur in the abstract, for political belief and association constitute the core of those activities
protected by the First Amendment.").
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more general right of privacy or of Fourteenth Amendment liberty." 17 8 Therefore, infringing upon a stronger constitutional right
could possibly be more invidious than infringing upon a right less explicitly grounded in the Constitution. It should also be noted that,
although the Farber court used the occasional rationality of political
patronage-in the case of the dismissal of a policy-making employee-to negate the invidious nature of political patronage gener79
ally, the plaintiff before it was a nonpolicy-making employee,
suggesting that the mitigating justification for political patronage used
by the court was not present in the case at hand.
The Farber court also followed the immutable characteristics test
used by the Third Circuit, 18 0 emphasizing previous circuit decisions
that found discrimination irrational and odious, because the discrimination at issue was motivated by immutable characteristics. 181 The
circuit's basis for finding invidious discrimination based upon immutable characteristics was that "such characteristics are 'determined by
the accident of birth' and 'bear[ ] no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society.'" 82 Therefore, because political affiliation depends on a mutable characteristic, such as opinion or conduct, discrimination on the basis of political affiliation did not bear the signs of
83
invidiousness.1
178. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 278 (1993) (citation omitted).
179. Farber, 440 F.3d at 133.
180. See Schindler, supra note 3, at 95-98; see also Matthew C. Hans, Note, Lake v. Arnold:
The Disabled and the Confused Jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 673, 699 & n.189 (1999). Schindler explains that the "immutable characteristics" test to
determine which groups were subject to section 1985(3) protection originated in Novotny v.
Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978). The Third Circuit
took the "immutable characteristics" requirement from Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973), in which the Supreme Court found that gender classifications were subject to "elevated
fourteenth amendment equal protection scrutiny." Schindler, supra note 3, at 95; see also infra
notes 181-182 and accompanying text. It should also be noted that the Farber court used "immutable characteristic" language in its determination of whether an identifiable class was shown.
Farber, 440 F.3d at 137; see supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text. The reader should be
aware of this dual use of "immutable characteristics" in the Farber court's determination of both
an identifiable class and an invidious discrimination to prevent any blurring between the two
separate analyses.
181. The court used Novotny (sex discrimination) and Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682 (3d Cir.
1997) (discrimination against the mentally retarded), as examples. Farber, 440 F.3d at 137, 142.
182. Farber, 440 F.3d at 142 (alteration in original) (quoting Novotny, 584 F.2d at 1243). The
Third Circuit's application of this principle in Lake could be questioned, because it can be argued that mental retardation does have an effect on "ability to perform." See City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432. 442 (1985) ("[I1t is undeniable, and it is not argued
otherwise here, that those who are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope with and
function in the everyday world.").
183. See Farber, 440 F.3d at 142. The court clarified that it did not "hold that discrimination
motivated by a mutable characteristic can never be invidious."
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However, the immutable characteristics approach has been criticized. One commentator has argued that Novotny did not cite to any
legislative history supporting the creation of categories based on immutable characteristics 84 and that the district courts in the Third Circuit "have applied the Novotny principles far beyond their intended
scope."'18 5 The dissent in Scott also implicitly rejected the immutable
characteristics approach by suggesting that other traits "should be
considered in delineating § 1985(3)."186

In the final stage of its discussion, the Farber court explained how
"[p]ermitting § 1985(3) to reach politically motivated conspiracies
would effectively outlaw all terminations based on political affiliation."1 87 However, this statement is not entirely accurate. It is true
that encompassing political classes under section 1985(3) could greatly
change the future of terminations from a government position based
on political affiliation, as was the case in Farber. In this instance, assuming a conspiracy was present, courts would no longer have to determine whether "party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for
the effective performance of the public office involved," as required
by Branti v. Finkel.'8 8 The situation changes, however, in the case of a
private conspiracy or a termination from a nongovernment position.
While section 1985(3) applies to public and private conspiracies alike,
184. Schindler, supra note 3, at 96. Schindler argued that section 1985(3) was designed to
protect African Americans, as well as their political "sympathizers." Id. According to Schindler,
the "latter group would be excluded under the Third Circuit's approach." Id.
185. Id. at 97 & n.58. Schindler contends that the Third Circuit in Novotny "explicitly limited
its discussion of section 1985(3) to the coverage of women," and therefore, the "immutable characteristic" guidelines should not have been used outside of this context. Examples of trial
courts' misuse of this test include denying section 1985(3) protection to other groups, including
Germans, tenant organizers, and individuals issued writs of protection. Id. at 97 & nn.59-61.
186. Schindler found that the following language represented an approach contrary to the
Third Circuit's approach:
Congress intended to provide a remedy to any class of persons, whose beliefs or associations placed them in danger of not receiving equal protection of the laws from
local authorities. While certain class traits, such as race, religion, sex, and national origin per se meet this requirement, other traits also may implicate the functional concerns
in other situations.
Id. at 98 n.65 (quoting Scott, 463 U.S. at 853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because the dissent
supported finding economic and political classes under the scope of section 1985(3), see Scott,
463 U.S. at 849-54 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), the inclusion of these classes based on mutable
characteristics contradict the Third Circuit's approach.
187. Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Keating v. Carey, 706
F.2d 377, 394 (2d Cir. 1983) (Meskill, J.,concurring and dissenting)).
188. 445 U.S. 507. 518 (1980). The Court abandoned the policy-making/confidential inquiry
enunciated in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), explaining that there are circumstances in
which a nonconfidential. nonpolicy-making position can be considered political, and also circumstances in which political affiliation is not relevant to a confidential, policymaking position.
Branti, 445 U.S. at 518.
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the rights vindicated under section 1985(3) differ depending upon the
conspiracy. Because the U.S. Supreme Court has viewed section
1985(3) as a purely remedial statute, 189 it has held that, for a private
conspiracy to be actionable under section 1985(3), the rights interfered with have to be "constitutionally protected against private, as
well as official, encroachment."' 90
To date, the Court has only recognized the "right to be free from
involuntary servitude" and the "right of interstate travel" as such
rights' 9 1 and has explicitly excluded First Amendment rights from the
same category. 92 Because a termination based upon political affiliation implicates the rights of political expression and association193
First Amendment rights-and it would be a rare instance where a putative plaintiff could allege that his termination infringed upon his
right to travel or to be free from slavery-expanding section 1985(3)
to cover political classes would not significantly affect terminations
carried out in the private sector. Thus, while it is likely that the majority of terminations based upon political affiliation are public terminations-situations in which political affiliation is expected to make
more of an impact upon termination decisions-and would possibly
be outlawed by including political classes under section 1985(3), the
fallout from extending section 1985(3)'s scope is not as severe as the
Farbercourt contended. Private terminations would largely be unaffected due to the nature of the rights that must be infringed upon to
state a cause of action.
B.

Did the Third Circuit Get Farber Right?

In deciding Farber,the Third Circuit decided a question that it had
declined to answer for almost a quarter of a century. It has now
joined a number of courts holding that a class based on political affiliation is not cognizable under section 1985(3), further deepening the
circuit split on this issue. 194 But was this decision correct? Did the
189. See Hans, supra note 180, at 705. This view was first recognized in Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979), and reaffirmed in Scott. Hans, supra
note 180, at 705 & nn.221-22; see also Novotny, 442 U.S. at 372 ("Section 1985(3) provides no
substantive rights itself; it merely provides a remedy for violation of the rights it designates.").
190. Scott, 463 U.S. at 833 (majority opinion).
191. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 278 (1993).
192. Scott, 463 U.S. at 830 (majority opinion) ("[A]n alleged conspiracy to infringe First
Amendment rights is not a violation of § 1985(3) unless it is proved that the State is involved in
the conspiracy or that the aim of the conspiracy is to influence the activity of the State."); id. at
833 ("[The First] Amendment restrains only official conduct ....").See also Hans, supra note
180, at 705-08 (discussing the rights vindicated under section 1985(3)).
193. See Elrod, 427 U.S. 347.
194. See supra note 114.

1082

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1053

Third Circuit use the correct approach? Would it have been more
prudent for the Third Circuit to reserve the question until the U.S.
Supreme Court has definitively addressed the issue? This Note argues
that Farber was correctly decided.
Anyone studying section 1985(3) jurisprudence, particularly the
question of inclusion or exclusion of political classes from the statute's
protection, will notice two major impediments to a clear resolution of
the issue: the lack of Supreme Court guidance 195 and the varying interpretations of the true meaning of the congressional debate leading
up to the enactment of the Ku Klux Klan Act, the statutory predecessor to section 1985(3).196 The result has been a range of suggested
97
solutions to the section 1985(3) puzzle by various commentators,
and a three-way split among the courts of appeals. 98 This Section
initially addresses the first major impediment: the lack of Supreme
Court guidance. 199 It then discusses the second major impediment:
the inability of courts to agree upon the proper reading of section
1985(3)'s legislative history. 200 Finally, this Section examines several
20
approaches to section 1985(3) analysis. '
1.

Lack of U.S. Supreme Court Guidance

A common thread running through this Note has been the lack of
U.S. Supreme Court guidance on the issue of political affiliation as a
class under section 1985(3). Although Scott20 2 implied in dicta that
section 1985(3) does not cover political classes, it did not decide the
issue conclusively. 20 3 The resulting quandary is that, although the
Court has suggested what it deems to be the proper scope of section
1985(3) as applied to political classes, certain circuits are bound by
pre-Scott decisions and analyses. 20 4 These circuits' jurisprudence, with
195. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
196. See infra note 211.
197. See, e.g., infra notes 223-229, 236-242 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 114.
199. See infra notes 202-210 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 211-222 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 223-247 and accompanying text.
202. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
203. See supra notes 52-54, 115, 135 and accompanying text.
204. The Second Circuit approvingly cited Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1983), regarding political classes and section 1985(3) in N.Y. State NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir.
1989). The Fifth Circuit decision in Galloway v. Louisiana, 817 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1987), was
bound by Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 623 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds,
648 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The Sixth Circuit in Conklin v. Lovely, 834 F.2d 543 (6th
Cir. 1987), explicitly stated that it was bound by Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973),
despite sister circuits' decisions following Scott's suggestion. Conklin, 834 F.2d at 549. These
three circuits include classes based on political affiliation under the scope of section 1985(3). It
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respect to coverage of political classes, is therefore frozen because of
the familiar rule that one panel in a circuit cannot overrule the decision of an earlier panel, absent an en banc decision or a U.S. Supreme
20 5
Court decision requiring the overruling of the earlier decision.
Conversely, other circuits, with the "benefit" of no circuit precedent,
are able to consider the Scott dicta in their quest to fulfill the "obligation of the subordinate jurisdictions to divine the direction of the
Court. ' 20 6 In fact, no circuit facing this issue as a matter of first impression post-Scott has held that political affiliation is a cognizable
class, either declining to answer the question or reading Scott to in207
struct it to that end.
By reading an exclusion of classes based upon political affiliation
from the Scott dicta, the Farbercourt correctly followed the trend of
circuits deciding the issue on a clean slate. While the majority opinion
in Scott has been criticized by some for implying that political classes
are not covered under section 1985(3),208 it is the sole Supreme Court
opinion directly discussing the issue in which a majority of the Court
agreed. The Third Circuit, while not bound by the decision, had an
obligation to hypothesize what the Court would decide based upon
that decision. It seems clear that the Scott majority, if "squarely
faced" 20 9 with the question, would have decided against recognizing
classes based on political affiliation. 2 10 Thus, the Farber court correctly followed this existing, although scant, guidance.
2.

What Did the 42nd Congress Mean?

Lack of U.S. Supreme Court guidance has also led to confusion
over the proper construction of section 1985(3)'s legislative history.
As one commentator has noted, attempts to discern the scope of section 1985(3) intended by the 42nd Congress have led to a multitude of
should be noted that the Eleventh Circuit is also bound by Kimble, because it was decided

before the Fifth Circuit was divided into the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. Cohen v. Office
Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir. 2000) ("pre-split" decisions binding on circuit); see
also THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 10.8.2, at 96 (Columbia Law Review

Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005) (noting that the Fifth Circuit split on October 1, 1981).
205. See, e.g., Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999); Jones v.
Coughlin, 45 F.3d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993); Salmi v.
Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985).
206. Grimes v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1359. 1366 (7th Cir. 1985).
207. See supra note 114.
208. See, e.g., Janis L. McDonald, Starting From Scratch: A Revisionist View of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) and Class-Based Animus, 19 CONN. L. REV. 471 (1987); Steven F. Shatz, The Second
Death of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3): The Use and Misuse of History in Statutory Interpretation,27
B.C. L. REV. 911 (1986). See also supra notes 52, 115, & 135 (noting relevant Scott dicta).
209. Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 139 (3d Cir. 2006).
210. See United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 835-37 (1983).
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interpretations. 2 11 This confusing array of section 1985(3) readings
has been compounded by the fact that, in the only case in which the
U.S. Supreme Court addressed the political affiliation question, the
majority and dissent did not even agree on what the legislative history
proposed. 21 2 The majority's reading suggested that Republicans were
intended to be protected, only because they were supporting African
Americans, not because of their political views. 2 13 When faced with
Senator Edmunds's statement, 21 4 the "clearest expression" of the view
that section 1985(3) reaches political classes, the majority found the
importance of the statement reduced, because the Griffin court had
not extended section 1985(3) to political classes, despite its knowledge
of the senator's statement. 2 15 The dissent, on the other hand, found
that "the 42d Congress viewed the Ku Klux Klan as pre-eminently a
political organization, whose violence was thought to be premised
most often on the political viewpoints of its victims. '2 16 More generally, the dissent found that Congress intended a "functional" scope of
211. McDonald, supra note 208, at 476. McDonald identified at least seven different arguments made for the intended purpose of the Ku Klux Klan Act:
(1) [T]o exclusively protect black citizens and their supporters against Klan violence;
(2) to protect victims of racial animus in general (3) to protect political, economic and
social groups oppressed in the South; (4) to protect those groups entitled to heightened
scrutiny under fourteenth-amendment, equal-protection analysis; (5) to protect against
all private and public conspiracies; (6) to protect solely against public conspiracies; and
(7) to protect any oppressed groups who were the victims of any conspiracies to deny
them equal protection or equal privileges and immunities under the law.
Id. As McDonald also observed, one reason for this slew of interpretations is that a court or
commentator can support an interpretation by using only certain statements from the legislative
history and ignoring (or perhaps being unaware of) statements militating against that interpretation. See id.
212. Compare Scott, 463 U.S. at 836-38 (finding the bill's central concern to be the protection
of African Americans and supporters), with Scott, 463 U.S. at 849-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(finding that Congress believed violence was racially, politically, and economically motivated).
213. Scott, 463 U.S. at 836 (majority opinion) ("The predominate purpose of § 1985(3) was to
combat the prevalent animus against [African Americans] and their supporters. The latter included Republicans generally, as well as others, such as Northerners who came South with sympathetic views towards [African Americans].") (emphasis added).
214. See supra note 115.
215. Scott, 463 U.S. at 836-37 (majority opinion) ("Lacking other evidence of congressional
intention, we follow the same course here."). The Fourth Circuit found this statement significant. Harrison v. KVAT Food Mgmt., Inc., 766 F.2d 155, 162 (4th Cir. 1985) ("The significance
of the Court's determination in Scott that the evidence of congressional intent did not warrant a
widening of the scope of protection under § 1985(3), beyond that previously afforded in Griffin,
should not be ignored."). The Scott majority also discounted the statement, because it was made
in the Senate, where only technical changes were made. 463 U.S. at 837.
216. Scott, 463 U.S. at 850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also id. at 853 (stating that the 42nd
Congress perceived the people injured by the Ku Klux Klan to be people who could not demand
law enforcement protection because of their political affiliation).
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section 1985(3), capable of protecting any class of persons, depending
2 17

on the circumstances.
In light of the Scott majority's reading of the legislative history, it
cannot be said that the Third Circuit incorrectly concluded that the
42nd Congress did not intend to "[g]ive [v]ictims of [p]olitical
[d]iscrimination a [clause of [a]ction. '' 218 This reading follows the majority view of the only U.S. Supreme Court opinion addressing the
issue and parallels the post-Scott interpretations adopted by two other
circuits not bound by circuit precedent. 21 9 Although the Third Circuit
is not bound by the decisions of these other circuits, circuit courts give
sister circuit decisions "most respectful consideration" and weight in
an attempt to maintain uniformity in the federal law. 220 Additionally,
previous Third Circuit decisions that interpreted the legislative history
of section 1985(3) did not address whether the Reconstruction-era
Congress intended to protect political classes. 221 While the debate
over the appropriate interpretation of the legislative history of section
1985(3) will continue-fueled primarily by commentators-courts
should follow the Farbercourt and rely upon the teachings of the Scott
2 22
majority and the analyses of other circuits.
3.

Suggested Approaches to Solving the Section 1985(3) Puzzle

In attempts to clarify the confusion that has engulfed section
1985(3) jurisprudence, commentators have proposed different courses
of action to map out the territory covered by a section 1985(3) claim.
While not all of these approaches tackle the political affiliation question directly, their analyses can be fitted to address that question.
One obvious approach is for a court to avoid the issue and decide a
case on alternative grounds where possible. 223 However much sense
217. Id. at 851 (stating that Congress intended to protect conspiracies involving invidious animus and the "possibility of ineffective state enforcement"). See also supra note 186.
218. Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2006).
219. See Grimes v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1359 (7th Cir. 1985); Harrison, 766 F.2d 155.
220. Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987); accord Aldens, Inc. v.
Miller, 610 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1979).
221. Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 686-88 (3d Cir. 1997) (addressing whether section 1985(3)
reaches handicapped classes); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235,
1238-43 (3d Cir. 1978) (addressing whether section 1985(3) reaches sex-discrimination).
222. A thorough analysis of section 1985(3)'s legislative history is outside the scope of this
Note; it is only discussed to show one of the difficulties in construing section 1985(3). For an indepth discussion of section 1985(3) and its legislative history, see Neil H. Cogan, Section
1985(3)'s Restructuring of Equality: An Essay on Texts, History, Progress, and Cynicism, 39
RUTGERS L. REV. 515 (1987).

223. Cf.Durden, supra note 50, at 211-12, 214 (criticizing the Fourth Circuit in Harrison for
making a blanket ruling on political classes where it could have decided the case on narrower
grounds).
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this proposal may have made in Scott's immediate aftermath and with
the optimism that the Court would definitively determine protected
classes in the near future, that optimism has since been eradicated by
the passing of more than twenty years without an elucidating decision.
Deciding cases in this fashion gives no guidance to the district courts
and only delays answering an inevitable question. The Farber court
realized the negative consequences of deciding the case before it on
the narrowest grounds-that a class was not alleged-and understood
22 4
the importance of providing guidance to the lower courts.
Another approach involves shifting the focus of section 1985(3)
analysis: examining the requirement of invidious discrimination
before addressing whether there is an identifiable class. 225 To aid in
determining the threshold question of invidious discrimination, this
approach looks to the "discriminatory purpose" standard of equal
protection jurisprudence and whether the discrimination is so invidious as to almost rise to the level of racism. 226 Once the court finds an
invidious discrimination, it applies the "class-based" requirement in
''an extremely broad manner," protecting any class that is "readily and
easily definable. ' 227 Limiting section 1985(3) claims would thus be
achieved by strictly applying the first requirement of invidious dis228
crimination to the facts of each individual case.
Another related argument focuses solely upon the invidiousness of
the discrimination and eliminates the class requirement. 229 Under this
approach, the plaintiff in Farber may have been able to clear the first
hurdle. 230 The Third Circuit viewed political patronage as occasionally having a rational basis-as in the case of replacing policy-making
224. Cf.supra note 113 and accompanying text.
225. See Hans, supra note 180, at 700-04.
226. Id. at 701. Both guidelines are taken from statements made in Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993). The "discriminatory purpose" standard implies that
the conspiracy was carried out "because of" class membership, and not "in spite of" class membership. See Hans, supra note 180, at 701 (quoting Bray, 506 U.S. at 271-72).
227. Hans, supra note 180. at 702. The class requirement proposed would have to satisfy the
requirements set forth in Bray and in Scott's dissent. Id. at 702 n.208; see also supra notes 62, 96
and accompanying text.
228. Hans, supra note 180, at 704 (suggesting that the section 1985(3) claim involved in Lake
v. Arnold would be dismissed, because defendants' sterilization of their mentally handicapped
daughter "may have stemmed from a concern for her health and welfare").
229. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 208. McDonald found that the "analysis of the animus
involved focuses on the kind of invidious discriminatory motivation behind the conspirator's act,
not on the victim's class status." Id. at 494-95. McDonald also contended that Griffin's "imposition of a showing of class-based animus is ill-founded and is at the root of the confusion and
inconsistency surrounding section 1985(3) and the Court's failure to extend the statute to cover
the types of injury it was intended to redress." Id. at 474.
230. Depending on the variation of the approach used, the plaintiff's failure to allege an identifiable class would have had different results.
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employees-to support its finding that political discrimination is never
invidious. 23 1 However, if the Farber court would have looked at the
political discrimination in this particular case, as opposed to discrimination generally, this rational basis factor would not have been present, because the plaintiff was a nonpolicy-making employee. Thus, in
this particular case, the political discrimination might have been more
invidious than one would consider it in the abstract. Additionally, it
could be argued that firing someone from his job, one's means of supporting himself and others, is more invidious than other actions
232
against the person.
Despite these possible arguments, and the contention that section
1985(3)'s legislative history does not support a class-based requirement, 233 Griffin established a class-based requirement. Courts must
address this issue. The sequence of determining invidious discrimination and an identifiable class has also been established by Bray, in
which the Court held that "women seeking an abortion" was not a
qualifying class before addressing the discrimination at hand.2 34 The
Farbercourt, therefore, faithfully followed suit in its resolution of the
issue.
Given the belief that section 1985(3) was enacted pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, 235 some courts and commentators have advocated an equal protection approach to determine the scope of section 1985(3).236 One commentator has suggested an approach
231. Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 142 & n.12 (3d Cir. 2006).
232. While most of the cases concerning political discrimination discussed in this Note involve
terminations, other acts of discrimination have been alleged in this context. See, e.g., Aulson v.
Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996) (illegal searches); Grimes v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1359 (7th Cir.
1985) (putting a same-name candidate in another race to defraud a defeated candidate). This
Note is not commenting on whether these acts are more invidious than termination.
233. McDonald, supra note 208, at 489 ("Nowhere in the legislative history is there an explicit
reference to a requirement of 'class-based animus."').
234. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1993).
235. The title of the Act that became section 1985(3) was "An Act to Enforce the Provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and for other Purposes."
Martin, supra note 19, at 735. There is some debate as to whether section 1985(3) was enacted
pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 19; see also U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.").
236. McDonald, supra note 208, at 495 & n.93. The reader should not interpret these equal
protection "approaches" as applying traditional equal protection "analysis." The following approaches do not actually apply the equal protection tiers of scrutiny to the classes, for example,
subjecting discrimination motivated by a person's race to strict scrutiny and asking whether the
discrimination was necessary to accomplish a compelling interest. Cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S.
429, 432-33 (1984) (describing the strict scrutiny test). The use of "equal protection analysis"
will refer to that analysis used in equal protection cases, and the use of "equal protection approach" will refer to the proposed methods of analysis to determine what classes are protected
by section 1985(3).
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incorporating rebuttable and irrebuttable presumptions based on the
scrutiny a court would employ if carrying out an equal protection
analysis for a particular class. 237 When a "suspect" class or a "fundamental right" is implicated and strict scrutiny would normally be applied, there would be an irrebuttable presumption that the section
1985(3) claim may stand. 238 In cases where a court would normally
apply rationality review to an equal protection claim, such as for an
economic or commercial class, a plaintiff would be doomed by the
23 9
irrebuttable presumption that a section 1985(3) claim cannot stand.
"Quasi-suspect" classes or other classes that would undergo "intermediate scrutiny" under an equal protection analysis, would be given a
rebuttable presumption either for or against having a section 1985(3)
claim, with that presumption eliminated if examination of the particu240
lar facts of the case determined that the presumption was incorrect.
A related approach protects classes that would receive "heightened" scrutiny under equal protection analysis-strict or immediate
scrutiny-with the exception of classes that receive strict scrutiny because of their exercise of a "fundamental right."'241 However, applying these equal protection approaches to section 1985(3) claims has
been criticized, because it ignores the fact that classes undergoing rationality review are still protected by the equal protection clause and
its analysis, although that protection is very slim. 24 2 Thus, the equal
protection approach does not give protection to classes that would
have some, albeit minute, protection under true equal protection
analysis.
Had the Farber court undertaken an equal protection approach to
decide whether section 1985(3) prohibited political discrimination, it is
237. Martin, supra note 19, at 759-62; see also McDonald, supra note 208, at 495 n.92 (describing the three tiers of equal protection analysis and to which classes they apply)..
238. Martin, supra note 19, at 760-62.
239. Id. at 759-61.
240. Id. at 761-62.
241. Schindler, supra note 3, at 99-107. The absence of protection for classes exercising "fundamental rights" is justified for the following reasons: (1) the Court has not extended protection
to economic or political groups, "even when these groups were exercising fundamental rights
(participation in the political process and freedom of association).... Thus, class members must
share more than the common exercise of fundamental rights to fall within the ambit of the statute": (2) "even though fundamental rights are employed in equal protection jurisprudence, they
are not direct progeny of the fourteenth amendment as the suspect classifications are"; and (3)
"adopting the fundamental rights approach would allow a plaintiff to fall within the ambit of
§ 1985(3) merely by making out a substantive violation, regardless of whether that violation was
motivated by a class-based animus." Id. at 103 n.104.
242. McDonald, supra note 208, at 496-97 & n.100 (giving the example of City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), as an instance in which a classification was struck
down under rationality review).
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possible that the Third Circuit would have decided in favor of protecting political classes. Although equal protection analysis does not afford heightened scrutiny to political groups, 243 one could argue that a
conspiracy to interfere with somebody's rights because of his political
affiliation impedes his fundamental right to vote and participate in the
political process. 244 A person might be unwilling to register with his
desired political party and cast his vote for a candidate he supports if
he knows that he might be more susceptible to termination or some
other conspiracy against him.
Despite the availability of these possible approaches to the section
1985(3) issue, the Farber court followed the immutable characteristics
approach used in Third Circuit jurisprudence. 24 5 Although this approach has been found "troublesome, ' 246 the Farber court correctly
applied it, because no U.S. Supreme Court case has rejected this approach or instructed circuits to follow a different approach. 24 7 Until
the Supreme Court definitively informs the circuit courts as to the appropriate method of analysis, each circuit will follow its own approach, and the goal of a uniform federal law will not be
accomplished.
V.

IMPACT

While Farber most directly impacts the district courts in the Third
Circuit, other circuits that have not yet decided whether to recognize
political affiliation as a section 1985(3) class may choose to use Farber
as a guidepost for their analyses, because it is the most recent decision
on the subject in a section 1985(3) landscape barren of recent guidance. Those circuits that have not yet decided the issue-the First,
Ninth, and the District of Columbia 248-will thus be the courts that
determine whether the split in the courts of appeals is deepened or the
recent trend of not recognizing political affiliation as a cognizable
class is continued. 249 Because the U.S. Supreme Court has not
squarely addressed the issue, other circuits that have answered the
question in the affirmative are bound by pre-Scott decisions and will
be unlikely to regard Farberas a reason to reverse their prior panels'
rulings with an en banc decision. Whatever the merits of each argu243. Martin, supra note 19, at 763.
244. See id.; Schindler, supra note 3,at 103 n.104; see also Harper v. Va. Bd.of Elections, 383

U.S. 663 (1966).
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See supra notes 130-133, 180-186 and accompanying text.
Schindler, supra note 3, at 96. See also supra notes 184-186 and accompanying text.
Schindler, supra note 3,at 97.
See supra note 114.
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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ment for or against extending section 1985(3) to political classes, it is
clear that, at its next given opportunity, the Court should conclusively
decide the issue.
The divisions and hostilities based on political differences, even
among members of the same political party, are growing deeper every
day, with harsh consequences. This is exemplified by the controversy
surrounding the forcing out or dismissal of several U.S. attorneys in
late 2006.250 The dismissals, which have been characterized as "unprecedented, 251 were largely influenced by politics, 252 although the
2 53
dismissed attorneys were appointed by President George W. Bush
2
54
and were, for the most part, Republicans.
In testimony arising out
of Congress's investigation of the matter, a former top Justice Department aide also admitted that she improperly considered political beliefs in reviewing applicants for nonpartisan legal jobs, such as
assistant U.S. attorney and other prestigious positions. 255 Irrespective
of any other legal remedies to which the dismissed U.S. attorneys or
the passed-over applicants may resort, 2 56 one might inquire whether
section 1985(3) would provide relief in light of Farber.
It is interesting to note that jurisdictions where the dismissed U.S.
attorneys could possibly bring suit include circuits that have not determined whether section 1985(3) protects political classes. 257 However,
250. Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Gonzales: 'Mistakes Were Made', WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2007,
at Al.
251. Julie Scelfo, 'Quite Unprecedented': Former U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White Explains Why
the Firing of Eight Federal Prosecutors Could Threaten the Historic Independence of Federal
Law-Enforcement Officials, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 2007, http://www.newsweek.com/id/36208/output/print. See also Eggen & Kane, supra note 250.
252. Eggen & Kane, supra note 250 ("The Justice e-mails and internal documents ... show
that political loyalty and positions on signature GOP policy issues loomed large in weighing
whether a prosecutor should be dismissed.").
253. See Dan Eggen, Prosecutor Firings Not Political, Gonzales Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 19,
2007, at A2.
254. Paul Kane & Dan Eggen, Second Lawmaker Contacted Prosecutor,WASH. POST, Mar. 6,
2007 (six of the eight U.S. attorneys were of the same political party as the current presidential
administration).
255. David Johnston & Eric Lipton, Ex-Justice Aide Admits Politics Affected Hiring, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 2007, at Al.
256. See supra notes 177, 188 and accompanying text. This is also ignoring any possible legal
differences there may be between political discrimination in the termination context and the
hiring context.
257. See supra note 114. One possible jurisdiction would be the D.C. Circuit, where the Department of Justice is located. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Contact Us, http://www.usdoj.gov/
contact-us.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2008); U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/courtlinks (last
visited Feb. 4, 2008) (map showing the geographical apportionment of the appellate circuits).
Other possible jurisdictions would include the location of the dismissed United States attorneys'
offices. In fact, six of the dismissed attorneys' offices were in states that are found in the Ninth
Circuit, which has also declined to decide the section 1985(3) political affiliation issue. See supra
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as previously discussed, courts since Scott have been reluctant to recognize political classes as protected under section 1985(3).258 In addition, any circuit relying on Farber's analysis could potentially throw
out a section 1985(3) claim brought by a dismissed U.S. attorney or
passed-over applicant, because the prospective plaintiff would not be
able to allege an identifiable class. 25 9 This is true for two reasons: (1)
most of the dismissed attorneys were members of the same political
party as the presidential administration, 260 thus not bringing into play
Farber'simplication that "membership in a political party" would constitute an "independently identifiable class";2 61 and (2) the dismissed
attorneys allegedly lost their positions, and the passed-over applicants
were not hired for nonpartisan legal jobs, at least in part because of
actions2 62 in which they engaged that would result in a definition of
the deprived class based on the plaintiff's conduct, violating the
2 63
Court's instruction in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic.
Victims of wrongdoing based upon political differences, as may be
the situation with the dismissed U.S. attorneys, need to know what
remedies are available to them. To the extent that these potential victims do know because they happen to live in a circuit that has not
decided the issue, the ability or inability to resort to a federal civil
rights statute for redress should be uniform throughout the country.
Perhaps in time the Farberdecision, and other court decisions relying
on Farber, will make the Court aware that political discrimination is
still alive almost twenty-five years after United Brotherhood of
Carpenters,Local 610 v. Scott and that the disunity in section 1985(3)
jurisprudence throughout the country needs to be remedied.
note 114; Kane & Eggen, supra note 254 (listing office locations where fired U.S. attorneys
worked); U.S. Courts, supra.
258. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 95-109 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
261. Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 2006). See also supra notes 109,
161-163 and accompanying text.
262. David Bowermaster, Charges May Result from Firings, Say Two Former U.S. Attorneys,
SEATTLE TIMES, May 9, 2007 (stating that the dismissed attorneys' handling of "ongoing publiccorruption or voter-fraud investigations" may have motivated the dismissal); Dan Eggen & Amy
Goldstein, Voter-Fraud Complaints by GOP Drove Dismissals,WASH. POST, May 14, 2007, at A4
(stating that "[niearly half the U.S. attorneys slated for removal ... were targets of Republican
complaints that they were lax on voter fraud"). See Johnston & Lipton, supra note 255 (stating
that a former Justice Department aide admitted that she researched whether job candidates
contributed money to Republican or Democratic candidates to determine the candidates' political background).
263. 506 U.S. 263, 269 (1993) ("[A class] unquestionably connotes something more than a
group of individuals who share a desire to engage in conduct that the § 1985(3) defendant disfavors."). See also supra notes 62, 164 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

In deciding Farber,the Third Circuit answered the call from its district courts for guidance on section 1985(3). It realized that the practice of deciding a case on the narrowest grounds possible would not be
beneficial in an area of jurisprudence wanting for case law. Additionally, the court correctly looked for any circuit and Supreme Court precedent. In an effort to predict how the Supreme Court would decide
this issue, the Third Circuit appropriately relied upon the Scott dictathe Court's only substantive statement on the relationship between
section 1985(3) and political affiliation-which implied that expanding
section 1985(3) was imprudent. The Farbercourt was further correct
to look to the circuit's immutable characteristics approach, which, although flawed, has not been repudiated by the Supreme Court and
should not be ignored absent an en banc or Court decision overruling
the precedent. It would be difficult to maintain that one's political
affiliation is an immutable characteristic.
This is not to say that there are not legitimate arguments for extending section 1985(3) to political classes. One could arguably read
section 1985(3)'s legislative history to protect those deprived of rights
because of their political affiliation. One could also contend that the
right to vote and participate in the political process is implicated. Further, growing divisions between those on different sides of the political spectrum may necessitate more protection from politically
motivated actions, especially in the employment context. However,
these considerations were properly subordinated to the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the legislative history and binding precedent.
Now that the Farber court has settled the question in its circuit, one
can only speculate as to how long the relationship between the scope
of section 1985(3) and political affiliation will remain unsettled in
other circuits and ultimately in the U.S. Supreme Court.
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